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The societal definition and control of deviance originated 
in the Garden of Eden when "woman" preferred "the forbidden 
fruit" to man and celestial retribution, rejection, 
retaliation and rehabilitation transpired. After a few 
millenia the rehabilitation services that we offer our social 
deviants: the "criminal," the "drug addict," "P.I.N.S.," the 
"mentally handicapped" and the "blind" have not advanced beyond 
the Biblical "solution"-namely, labeling, ostracism and the 
imposition of stigmata. Indeed, our rehabilitative agencies 
are so in name only, beneath the guise of professionalism dis-
played in these agencies is the latent function which they, 
perform: they are contemporary "zoo keepers of deviance." 
The lessons of Attica, the insights of Menninger,2 Mitford.3 
and Sykes^ all question the viability and feasibility of 
rehabilitation within the parameters of our existing penal 
or "correctional" institutions. The dominant theme running 
throughout the literature on penology is that our correctional 
institutions are "holding cages" designed for social control 
but not for the social rehabilitation of the inmate. Attica 
has sensitized us to the need for true prison reform and 
wardens are now finding it somewhat difficult to direct 
prison social systems that they themselves have come not to 
believe in. 
Nevertheless, the purpose of this article is not to 
consider an analysis of institutional penal reform, a 
number of commissions are devoting themselves to that 
endeavor; hopefully their efforts will be fruitful and their 
insights synthesized and acted upon. What we wish to consider 
is the nature of a select type of social service that is 
being offered to one distinct marginal group in our society: 
institutionalized, dependent, physically-sound children. By 
examining some of the major modalities employed in the 
institutional treatment of this distinct grouping we would 
hope to show how once again our "best" rehabilitative efforts 
only reinforce and create deviance instead of reintegrating 
the client into the dominant social structure. 
Realizing that "rehabilitation" and other social services must be 
analyzed within the framework of the fabric of American society and its value 
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complex, it would be helpful to survey that culture complex as it exists in the 
urbanized, bureaucratized, industrialized, post-industrial state that char-
acterizes the 1970's. Over fifty years ago Georg Simmel warned that 
The deepest problems of modern life derive from the claim 
of the individual to preserve the autonomy and individual-
ity of his existence in the face of overwhelming social 
forces, of historical heritage, of external culture, and 
of the technique of life.5 
Another classic social theorist, Max Weber also noted that an urban culture 
often eventuates in impersonalization as a result of its structure as a 
market-settlement.6 A contemporary social theorist, Alvin Gouldner attests to 
the validity of the Simmel-Weber thesis when he points out that 
...In large reaches of our society and particularly in 
the industrial sectro, it is not the man that is wanted. 
It is, rather, the function he can perform and the skill 
with which he can perform it for which he is paid. If a 
man's skill is not needed, the man is not needed. If a man's 
function can be performed more economically by a machine, 
the man is replaced.7 
Gouldner emphasizes that the utilitarian culture which characterizes American 
society forces the individual to suppress or repress vast parts of his personality 
in the course of playing a role in industrial society. Punctuality, 
calculability and exactness become the instrumental values through which modern 
man becomes a functionnaire.8 
It is no wonder that given the above mentioned restrictions that modern 
post-industrial man should suffer from a symbolic shortcoming in meaning - an 
identity crisis. Orrin E. Klapp has delineated the dominant common symptoms 
of the all pervasive identity problem. Amongst the symptoms are: a feeling 
of being blemished, self-hatred, oversensitivity, excessive seif-concern, a 
feeling of alienation, a feeling of unrealized potential, a desire to be 
someone else, excessive consciousness of playing a "plastic role," and 
excessive other directedness.9 The sources which lead to this identity crisis 
are structural, not individual per se. American society is characterized by a 
future-shock technology, a knowledge explosion, mobil pluralism, lack of meaning-
ful employment and the opportunity to prove oneself within the confines of the 
Protestant ethic. When one adds to this structural potpouri advertising 
pressures which stimulates the struggles for status symbols one is not surprised 
that feelings of powerlessness, anomie, marginality and alienation characterize 
the American people. Given this trend towards impersonality and mass-alikeness 
of human relations the dominant question of the twentieth century becomes 
"Who am I?" 
Philip Slater suggests that three human desires are deeply frustrated by 
American culture: The desire for community—the wish to live in trust and 
fraternal cooperation; the desire for engagement—the wish to come directly to 
grips with impersonal problems; the desire for dependence—the wish to share 
responsibility for the control of one's impulses and direction of one's life. 
Social workers express the same concept in terms of individual human needs; 
the need for affection, the need for security, the need for achievement, the 
need for acceptance in a group. As a result of the structural value complex an 
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avoidance tendency has grown within the American character. Slater notes that 
our approach to social issues inevitably falls back on cinematic tradition in 
which social problems are solved by a wave of the magic wand or by gesture. 
Once a law is passed, a commission established, a study completed, a report 
concretized, the problem is expected to have been "solved." Slater calls our 
attention to the fact that: 
...The institutions we provide for those who cannot care 
for themselves are human garbage heaps-they result from and 
reinforce our tendency to avoid confronting social and 
interpersonal probi ems.10 
Our ideas about institutionalizing the psychotic, the aged, the retarded, 
delinquent, criminal, blind, and infirm are based on a cultural avoidance 
mechanism called the Toilet Assumption. As Michael Harrington and others note 
our approach to social problems is to exercise them out of our consciousness by 
physically removing the symptom of the problem—the deviant—from our line of 
vision; in sum, we literally flush him away from our consciousness.H When our 
discharded problems rise to the top of our cesspools, as they did at Attica, 
we are shocked and disgusted. Immediately we call in a "social plumber"—a 
sociologist or social worker to head a commission so as to anesthetize ourselves 
to reality. This is the nature of our crisis mentality. Thus, our social 
problems are ghettoized, social conflict diminishes, disorder receded and we 
again attain a purified identity.12 
If the "Toilet Assumption" does not function adequately then we resort to 
another ideological process: blaming the victim. William Ryan theorizes that 
"blaming the victim" is an ideological process, a set of ideas and concepts 
deriving from systematically motivated, but unintended distortions of reality 
designed to change an individual deviant and not the structural problems that 
cause individual problems. As Ryan notes: 
And almost all our make-believe liberal programs aimed at 
correcting our urban problems are off target; they are 
designed to change the poor man or to cool him out.13 
Thus, in oiir consumer society, a society which tends to depersonalize, manipulate, 
and alienate, we pursue the dying myth of underending consumption and consume 
prepackaged values.H Suffering from our own structurally induced inadequacies 
we exist in the culture of silence consciously or unconsciously attempting to 
insulate ourselves to the social problems that surround us. It is within this 
"Gesta!t" of a culture of emotional poverty that our social services are 
conducted. 
After surveying five residential treatment centers which may be character-
ized as "total institutions" designed to care for the physical and emotional 
needs of a group of children who were labeled "P.I.N.S." or "wards of the 
State," and who ranged in age from five to eighteen years, the authors recognized 
the same consistent pattern of socialization and "rehabilitation" which permeated 
the therapeutic milieu of each and every agency. Realizing the narrow scope of 
the research design, the authors are aware of the severe limitations of their 
statements. Nevertheless, since our observations on the nature of residential 
treatment agencies are in agreement with a substantial body of theoretical 
research on the nature of residential treatment milieus, we have chosen to 
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generalize our specific findings about the major modalities of residential 
social services provided for children. 
The unstated assumption of the accommodative philosophy that permeates the 
above mentioned institutions is that the majority of the clients will end up 
organizing their lives around the agency. The "child" has little choice but to 
remain a part of the environment that has been designed and engineered to 
accommodate him. As Bredemeier has noted the return of the client to the 
community does not carry with it any guarantee that he is now a "finished pro-
duct" who can be socially integrated into the society. Requirements of con-
ventional life within the community, community performance requirements are 
largely ignored by the treatment and socializing agency. Bredemeier points 
out that: 
...many agencies have been forced away from defining them-
selves as in the business of producing productive and 
responsible citizens. Many of them seem to have accepted 
the conception that they are warehouses for storing people 
until someone withdraws them, or they escape, or are other-
wise conveniently gotted rid of. 15 
Thus, within the residential institution the goal of maturation is dis-
torted to mean an improvement in the degree of internalization of institutional 
norms. The concept of maturation which is espoused by the institution is a 
goal which is functional for the institution and requires long-term maintenance 
of the client. The definition of successful socialization is revised from a 
process of learning by which an individual is prepared to meet the requirements 
that society has set for his behavior in a variety of social situations to a 
process of learning survival norms for institutional culture. The agencies' 
socialization process seems to contradict a basic social-psychological principle: 
The identity of the individual, both to himself and to others, 
is largely compounded of the web of symbolic communications by 
which he is linked to the external world; the structure of 
the human personality is so much a product of social interaction 
that when this action ceases it tends to decay.'6 
In sum, the residential programs do not adequately develop a reality oriented 
approach to aid children to integrate into the dominant culture from a position 
of strength. The manifest function of rehabilitation develops into the latent 
function of reinforcement into a dysfunctional dependent role. 
The treatment center becomes a tension-management device that thwarts the 
child's maturational process, prevents the development of an adequate concept 
of self and subsequently infantilizes him. Instead of a socialization for 
multiple societal adaptions the child is regimented within the institutional 
culture. Erik Erikson and other developmental psychologists constantly note 
that growth is often a process of confronting new situations and adequately 
coping with these situations. In the regimented institutional milieu these 
experiences are quite often non-existent. 
The argument of the societal reaction theorists would be helpful in develop-
ing a framework for summarizing our research observations.1'7 The main argument 
of the societal reaction theorists is that persons who have experienced a series 
of unfavorable societal reactions as a result of a primary deviance often alter 
that deviance, internalize the negative societal reactions, and become 
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secondarily deviant. The child in need of supervision, the abused child, the 
neglected child already suffers from primary deviance. Within the institutional 
nexus he is socialized for dependency, he is routinized and thereby develops a 
secondary deviance. In sum, we maintain that in the residential treatment 
center social work counseling, psychological testing, treatment, individualized 
educational programs, and other "innovative techniques" all develop out of an 
overriding concern for custodial care. All of these services are ancillary and 
an extension of the custodial institutional process. The latent function of 
the institution becomes socialization into a dependency situation that allows 
custodial personnel to maintain order, to maintain "a holding-operation." 
The above research observations are not unique, indeed they follow in a 
long history of institutional analysis and organizational criticism. Erving 
Goffman,18 David Wineman,19 Robert Vinter20 have all noted that residential 
institutions often substitute standardization for individualization and treat 
clients as an amorphous whole. The consequences of this process are regimenta-
tion, depersonalization, dehumanization, alienation, in a word, secondary 
deviance. The situation and consequences of client powerlessness and agency 
overcontrol were summarized in a comprehensive report on deprivation issued by 
the National Institute of Child Health and Development. The report notes that 
"...welfare and other recipients of community agencies are not only afflicted 
by a sense of powerlessness but also are afflicted by a sense that they have 
no choice but to adopt stances of abject passivity in order to survive.21 Over 
ten years ago the President's Panel on Disability developed an "innovative 
proposal" regarding residential institutions. The panel observed: 
The challenge to State institutions is how to accelerate the 
change from large isolated facilities, to smaller units close 
to home of the patients and to the health, education, and 
social resources of the community; and the challenge to both 
state and private residential facilities is how to replace 
the old concept of custodial care, wherever it still exists, 
with modern programs of therapy, education, and research/^ 
The striking fact is that more than ten years after the bulk of research on 
residential institutions was published, nothing has substantially or intrinsi-
cally changed within institutional socialization networks. Our research findings 
coincide with the organizational criticism that was leveled at treatment 
agencies by social workers and sociologists in the early 1960's. Two questions 
immediately come to mind: "Why is this so?" and "What can be done?" 
The seemingly logical explanation for the persistence of institutional 
ills would be agency size. The necessity of caring for and co-ordinating the 
activities of a large number of clients on a twenty-four hour basis does create 
pressures for routinization and regimentation. Nevertheless as Vinter points out: 
...the use of standarized group management procedures is not 
determined simply by size, but by choice among alternative 
technologies. When clients are viewed as more alike than 
different they can conveniently be handled routinely and 
in the aggregate.23 
If the dominant explanation for agency philosophy does not necessarily 
center around size, it possibly centers around an attitudinal component 
reflecting two different constituencies whose "needs" the agency is meeting. 
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These needs may actually be not only different but contradictory. Scott points 
out: 
As a rule, the constituency consisting of people in the 
community is a much more powerful one than the constituency 
consisting of stigmatized people. The reasons for this are 
that laymen, and not clients, control an institution's 
financial resources, do that lay control and power are built 
directly into the fabric of the program.24 
In sum, the agency is "serving" two masters, a dependent institutionalized 
population and the larger society. Given the parameters of the American value 
complex and the tendency for isolation and insulation of society from the dominant 
social problems, the anesthesia syndrome, it becomes apparent that the "problem 
solving" style of the agency will be a slow, reactive, and post factum one 
designed to serve the status quo. As Gouldner notes: 
Rather than taking a lead on the target, therefore, the 
Welfare State commonly shoots directly at or behind it. 
But the ineffectuality of the Welfare State derives even 
more fundamentally from the fact that it must seek solutions 
within the framework of the master institutions that 
cause the probi em.25 
The second explanation for the persistence of the institutional structure 
and socialization techniques is the relative powerlessness of the social worker 
within the structure of the agency's bureaucratic organization. The bureaucratic 
structure of which the worker is a part manipulates and co-opts him in order to 
preserve the status quo, thus the worker is forced to struggle on behalf of his 
clients from a position of powerlessness which often eventuates in treating 
clients as objects.26 As Howard and Somers note in their essay on resisting 
institutional evil from within: "Unless he is careful, the spy comes in from 
the cold and forgets being a spy."27 Therefore the case worker involves 
himself in a continued progressive therapy of symptoms which at best is merely a 
process òf "Bandaiding" a severe wound. Given these structural restraints the 
question of what can be done arises. 
With sufficient structural changes the residential agency can serve as a 
beachhead into the dominant value complex. It should provide the same type of 
base for security, peace and psychosocial satisfaction that the immigrant 
community has historically provided.28 perhaps Talcott Parsons' general 
paradigm of four stages for the social control of deviant behavior can be 
operationalized and applied to the control of secondary deviance.29 i n achieving 
the complete reintegration of an individual into a group which had labelled 
him as deviant, the client must traverse four stages: support, permissiveness, 
restriction of reciprocity and reward. In the first stage, support, the child is 
assured that he is not rejected by the "normal smiths" and that he is accepted 
as capable of performing a normal role. This stage therefore helps eliminate 
the self-fulfilling prophecy which fosters non-deviant behavior. The second 
stage is permissiveness: the child is not held responsible for recurrences of 
secondary deviance as long as he is attempting to avoid them. The third stage 
is restriction of reciprocity: while recurrence of deviance is understood it 
is not encouraged thereby preventing the "change agent" from reinforcing the 
secondary deviance. The final stage is providing esteem, that is rewarding 
any conformity that the child manifests, conformity being defined as behavior 
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which makes him less dependent on the institution and more capable of inte-
grating into the dominant culture complex from a position of strength. 
Nevertheless, as a result of our individualistic orientated value complex 
and our avoidance tendencies we as a society have limited the possibilities of 
collective action for the rehabilitation and reintegration of the "deviant." 
As Zald notes: 
If cultural traditions place a strong emphasis on individual 
responsibility and action, then collective solutions are 
likely to be resisted. On the other hand, a group can have 
values which stress an importance of collective actions as a 
general rule and, consequently, welfare problems, too, will 
call forth a collective response.30 
Ivan Illich warns that the future depends more upon our conscious choice of 
institutions which support a life of action rather than on our developing new 
ideologies and new technologies. The solution lies not in quantification-
pouring new funds into old institutions but rather we need a set of criteria 
which will permit us to recognize those institutions which support personal 
growth over addiction.31 Illich notes that these institutions should be 
convivial as opposed to our existing manipulative institutions. By logical 
extension, our manipulative social services agencies are either socially or 
psychologically addictive. Social addiction consists in the tendency to pre-
scribe increased treatment if smaller quantities do not yield the required 
results. Thus bigger residential institutions, bigger jails and bigger nursing 
homes are preferred as the panacea for our auto-anesthesia. Unfortunately, this 
"panacea" leads to the ritual of rising deceptions.32 if the creation of 
convivial institutions is the goal how can it be implemented, how can social 
case work methodology aid in its implementation, and finally what is the set 
of criteria which permits us to recognize those institutions which foster and 
support human growth? 
Since our problems are processive in nature what is needed is a processive 
social work methodology and processive sociological construct as opposed to 
methodologies and theories which pass for the definitive statements about the 
social construction of reality. Social workers need a philosophical and ethical 
framework that provides guidelines for social work intervention. Realizing that 
social work neutrality (non-judgemental attitude) is a myth, the caseworker must 
combine efforts to help clients with efforts to change society. The social 
worker must be conscious of the fact that he is involved in the politics of 
therapy and must evaluate his role in terms of its impact on the social system. 
Social workers must maneuver themselves into positions as agents within the 
agency structure at the same time as they diminish the pervasive agency insecurity 
which eventuates from institutional change. In sum, social workers must see that 
their roles as "advocates" and "enablers" are essential and that social planning 
and social action is imperati ve.34 At the same time, caseworkers must be prag-
matic about the limits of social change. What is needed in social work is a 
"typology of advocacy" -- advocacy must be divided into two distinct but com-
plimentary areas. Lower level advocacy which involves "bandaiding" is essential 
for the "resolution" of the clients' immediate problems. Higher level advocacy 
which opts for social change and institutional reform is also quite essential. 
Social work must develop a division to realize its twin goal. 
48 Kansas Journal of Sociology 
In a society which suffers from an avoidance tendency, conscientization is 
necessary. Although the politics of destabilization and deinstitutionalization 
as advocated by radical sociologists and social workers seems praiseworthy 
it fails to take cognizance of the societal power structure as it exists. The 
social worker as a pragmatist should avoid subjecting himself and his client 
to a martyr role. As an advocate and enabler the social worker should be 
aware of the following limitations and obstacles for change: 
1) collaborative strategies will result only in programs and 
policies which the existing power configuration deems acceptable 
2) power will not be surrendered voluntarily 
3) when institutional change is being attempted social workers 
will often find themselves co-opted and control led.35 
Although it is nice to dream about Camelot it would be cruel for social 
workers and sociologists to drug themselves into the belief that Camelot is 
attainable in one grand revolutionary master plan. What is needed is many 
people conscientiating and sensitizing each other to the problems and processive 
solutions for our societal ills. Nevertheless, it is necessary to realize 
that even conscientization has structural and temporal limits. 
As a step towards sensitization and conscientization the authors suggest 
the following criteria for the evaluation of existing social service agencies 
and for the establishment of convivial institutions. Although the questions 
were drawn from our experience evaluating residential child care agencies, the 
criteria center around two polarities: the agency and the client. 
As a change-agent the social worker should ask the following questions of 
the agency: 
A) Who are the real direct and indirect consumers of the 
service as provided? 
B) Are innovations cloaks for the status quo and political 
tension-management devices? 
C) How can you prevent the change-agent from inordinately 
threatening other professional agency personnel? 
As an advocate and enabler the social worker should ask the following questions 
about his client: 
A) How does the client view his role within the agency 
structure: Whe is he there and why does he think he is there? 
B) In the process of "rehabilitation" or "Custodial care" within 
the therapeutic milieu, is the client further dehumanized 
and made inordinately dependent? 
C) Within the agency milieu has the client been socialized 
for reality or has he been socialized into a dependent 
institutional role which he internalizes and which prevents 
societal integration. 
In sum, uniting both areas the social worker must determine if the agency has 
a preoccupation with custodial care or social reintegration and what are the 
alternative interpersonal networks necessary for the social reintegration of 
the client. 
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In sum, we argue that social workers and sociologists should not delude 
themselves and the public about the true dysfunctionality of their bandaiding 
syndrome but rather should demand further future research for new alternative, 
convivial, institutional structures. The solution is not simply more fundings 
being poured into existing child care agencies which perpetuate dependency 
and create secondary deviance. What is needed is a national conscientization 
of the implications of the Toilet Assumption as it applied to all marginal 
groupings: the "blind," the "addicted," the "criminal" and the child who 
becomes a "ward of the state." Forever we should keep in mind the warning of 
Bernard, Ottenberg and Redi: 
No one, of course, could possibly retain his mental health 
and carry on the business of life if he remained constantly 
aware of, and emphatically sensitive to, all the misery 
and injustice that are in the world. But this very 
essentiality of dehumanization, as with defenses, makes 
for its greatest danger: that the constructive self-
protection it achieves will cross the ever-shifting boundaries 
of adaptiveness and become destructive, to others as well as 
to the self. 3 6 
As they develop their social intervention ethic social workers should 
bear in mind that social charity never replaces social justice. Realizing 
that the greater divider of people is insecurity and that in the twentieth 
century the only way social casework can prevent itself from going backwards 
is to go forward. Social workers and sociologists must move for the develop-
ment of an ethic that avoids the quantified revolution of rising deceptions. 
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